Israel – Page 103

Do we all agree? No. Care? A lot.

If there was any doubt that Jews around the world have strong feelings and opinions about Israel, it was disabused by a major new paper produced by the Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI).

Jewish and Democratic: Perspectives from World Jewry was released several weeks ago at a conference in New York state. It is the result of 40 discussion groups and seminars around the world, as well as questionnaires and an analysis of existing research. The process included participants from much of Canada, though none from Vancouver.

The diversity of comments and the consensus that appears from the document are not particularly startling, but they are interesting for their quantification of some things we probably already assumed. The most significant “finding” seems to be that Jews around the world take great interest in Israel, its security, future, successes, failures and ethical challenges.

The report was undertaken in response to Israel’s Ministry of Justice considering legislation that would codify Israel’s Jewish and democratic character “at a time when different ideological groups within Israel hold conflicting views of how these components should be prioritized.” Israel has always tried to be democratic and Jewish. Long-term concerns are that high Arab and low Jewish birthrates could imperil the Jewish majority and, therefore, the Jewish and democratic system, particularly if some resolution is not found for the stateless Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. More immediately, tensions have existed over questions of whether Israel is Jewish enough and/or democratic enough. Given the range of opinion on the matter, efforts to pin down the perfect recipe for a democratic Jewish state will be like nailing Jell-O to the wall.

We suspect that any proposed legislation will flounder in a tsunami of pilpul, much like the continual but inconclusive debate over “who is a Jew,” which revives itself several times in this report. Even so, the discussion is worth having and the report is full of provocative nuggets.

Jews of all ages are apparently more willing to criticize Israeli policies than was the case several decades ago. In considering Israel’s “Jewish and democratic” nature, the most common concern among Diaspora Jews is the inequality between Jews and Arabs within Israel, as well as political and military control over non-citizen Palestinians in the West Bank. Concern over treatment of Bedouins also arises. As small minorities in their home countries, Diaspora Jews have a “special sensitivity to minority rights,” says the report. (We like that the report uses the term “world-Jews,” which sounds like a hip neologism, like “world music.”)

Many participants express concerns over the enforcement of Orthodox standards in civil society. One comment is that Israel is now a “Jewish Orthodox democracy.” Another participant asserts that, “As a Jewish state, Israel needs to be pluralistic and Jewishly diverse.”

Previous research has indicated that many Jewish Americans (and others) resent that the Kotel has a strict gender separation and that enforcement is controlled by the Orthodox. At the conference where the report was released, one Conservative woman expressed her view: “Our support of Israel is unambiguous, it’s wall-to-wall. But I want to know there is a place for me where I can put on my tallit every morning. May I do that in the state of Israel and not have things thrown at me? Will the government arrest me? Is there a place for me in Israel?”

It turns out we’re not so different, Diaspora and Israel. Nearly three-quarters of Israelis disapprove of the way their governments handle religious issues.

Overall, the report suggests that Diaspora Jews on the far right prioritize Israel’s Jewish character over its democratic nature, while those on the far left view Israel’s Jewish character as an anachronism. The majority, the report says, want to have it both ways – and believe it is possible to do so.

Despite recent suggestions of a weakening of the bond between Israel and Diaspora Jews, particularly among young people, Jews in diverse countries overwhelmingly declare themselves connected with Israel and identify as Zionist. The report acknowledges that some younger Jews, particularly in the United States, as evidenced in the Hillel movement, are reacting against strictures laid down by their elders over what are appropriate views to hold on topics around Israel. The report takes some pains to note that these young people do not necessarily disagree with the broader consensus around Israel, its Jewish and democratic nature or other factors, but do resent being told what they are allowed to believe, hear and say.

Breaking news? Not much. Still, the report – and, most especially the constructive dialogues that went into creating it – is a sort of snapshot in time of the Diaspora’s thoughts on Israel. Beyond the details, which are themselves interesting, is the tremendous consensus that we care about Israel very, very deeply.

Pope tries to please in Holy Land

The whirlwind visit to the Holy Land by the head of world Catholicism, Pope Francis, left commentators hyperventilating. The brief, two-day excursion was ram-jam full of symbolism, some of it seemingly contradictory.

After visiting Jordan, the Pope traveled to Bethlehem, pointedly referring to the area as the “state of Palestine.” He made an unscheduled stop at the security barrier, adjacent to graffiti reading “Pope we need some 1 to speak about Justice … Bethlehem look like Warsaw ghetto.” The Pope placed his forehead against the barrier and prayed, in an image most commonly associated with visitors to the Western Wall, a few kilometres away.

The Pope’s visit was emphatically billed as “strictly religious” and non-political, but, it appears, everything is political in this part of the world, most of all religion. The “state of Palestine” was festooned in posters of the pope conjoined with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. Images abounded of Palestinian suffering parallel with images of the suffering of Jesus, from which some viewers might conclude that the same people who have for millennia borne the blame for the one incident are also solely responsible for the other. Of course, the Pope’s entourage was not responsible for Photoshopping done by Palestinian partisans. Yet, neither was the Pope’s time in Israel free from perceptions of politicization. He visited the tomb of Theodor Herzl, which must certainly have appeared to Palestinians as unambiguous as his reference to the “state of Palestine.”

The Pope invited Abbas and Israel’s President Shimon Peres to a prayer summit at the Vatican – an invitation both leaders accepted and which is to take place next week. Some commentators have noted that Peres is a figurehead who will not be directly involved in future peace negotiations and whose term is nearly at an end, but papal spokespeople noted that Francis and Peres have developed a cordial relationship and the event should not be seen as a snubbing of Abbas’ counterpart in peace talks, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. The prayer summit is seen as an opportunity to recast religion as a unifying force in the Israeli-Palestinian relationship, rather than the divisive force as which it is frequently perceived. The invitation is an interesting gambit, and an apparently overt move by the Pope to insert the Vatican back into the centre of global diplomacy where it sat for centuries. And while prayers for peace are always welcome, a mass prayer at the Vatican some months ago for peace in Syria seems to have fallen on deaf ears. Still, it can’t hurt.

Papal visits, in the age of 24-hour news, are highly visual and symbolic. Symbolism is powerful, particularly in scenarios of diplomatic complexity. But, by definition, symbolism lacks nuance. The Pope apparently attempted to please everybody, by paying homage to the national rights of both peoples. But while he voiced explicit hopes for an end to terrorism and for the right of Israelis to live in security – which, all ancillary issues aside, are the two pillars upon which eventual peaceful coexistence will stand – his symbolic efforts to please both sides are as likely to please no one. In this, Pope Francis is in good company with everyone else who has attempted to walk the impossible line of equanimity in this conflict.

Meanwhile, as attention was focused to the Middle East, events in Europe reflected a sadly repetitive history. As Pope Francis was incanting “Never again” at Yad Vashem and at a memorial to victims of terror, families were mourning the murders of four at a Jewish museum in Brussels. The Pope condemned the attack as a “criminal act of antisemitic hatred.” As well, the Pope’s travels partially eclipsed news of fringe extremist groups, some openly antisemitic, making significant gains in elections to the European parliament.

As Pope Francis returns to his home in the Vatican and prepares to welcome Abbas and Peres, there is no shortage of topics to pray about.

We must be able to engage in dialogue

While the conflict between Israel and Palestine plays out via an ever-ailing peace process, outside of the Middle East, the relationship is conducted by increasing attempts at silencing opponents. As far as I can tell, this silencing stems from great communal fear that Israel’s political and philosophical opponents pose a dire threat. But, given Israel’s secure military position and America’s unwavering support, something doesn’t quite add up. Let’s take a look at the political landscape.

The longer Israel and the Palestinians coexist in deadlock, the more critics of Israel are deepening their opposition to Israel’s core political identity. These Israel critics believe that saying that Israel is a Jewish and democratic state, as Zionists proclaim, is an oxymoron. They believe, instead, that calling Israel a Jewish state denies the reality of its Palestinian minority, who comprise 20 percent of Israel’s citizens. They believe that Israel cannot deign to call itself a democracy while continuing the decades-long occupation. Neither do they believe that a democracy can allow unfettered Jewish immigration while denying the same rights to Palestinian refugees.

These critics of Israel believe that Israel is an apartheid state. Unlike Secretary of State John Kerry, who said privately (before publicly apologizing) that Israel is headed down an apartheid road unless it achieves a negotiated end to the conflict, these critics believe that Israel is already there.

Because of my vocal liberal Zionist position, I have been among the targets of these critics. I summed up this dynamic in my final piece for the Daily Beast’s Open Zion blog, a piece I called “No one loves a liberal Zionist.” In a short piece last year, one commentator, writing on the anti-Zionist blog Mondoweiss, even compared my call for a two-state solution to Jim Crow-era-style segregationist manifestos.

Those familiar with my writings know that while I am frequently critical of Israeli policies, I still believe that Israel can be saved from itself. Ending the occupation and enacting legal reform to address disparities between Jewish and non-Jewish citizens will enable Israel to retain its core identity of being both Jewish and democratic.

“I work on the assumption that true friendship involves holding up a mirror to the face of one’s friend. Helping Israel end the occupation is, therefore, a moral imperative for the Diaspora Jewish community.”

Readers of the Independent may associate my column more with criticism than with defence of Israel. It is true that I typically use this forum to encourage our community to consider how we can help Israel emerge from the tragic conundrum it has found itself. I work on the assumption that true friendship involves holding up a mirror to the face of one’s friend. Helping Israel end the occupation is, therefore, a moral imperative for the Diaspora Jewish community.

Unlike those on the far left, though, I believe that without prejudicing the lives of citizens within a given state, every country has the right to define its identity as it sees fit. And as a Jew who was raised with Zionist narratives and feels a deep emotional connection to Israel, I admit a certain subjective attachment to the idea of maintaining a Jewish and democratic state.

Given all this complexity, and the need to dialogue and engage more than ever, I am concerned that a chill factor is setting into our communities. This silencing is painted with a broad brush. David Harris-Gershon, author of the excellent book What Do You Buy the Children of the Terrorist Who Tried to Kill Your Wife?, was disinvited in February from giving a book talk at the Washington, D.C., Jewish community centre. And, as campus Hillels have made headlines for imposing strict bans on who may share a podium (those who, according to the guidelines, seek to “delegitimize, demonize or apply a double standard to Israel”), some colleges, like Swarthmore and Vassar, have signaled their opposition to this silencing, declaring theirs an “Open Hillel.”

Every time I hear about another instance of the community seeking to police discourse that falls within the bounds of civil, if impassioned or provocative debate, I think this: if we cannot engage in dialogue with those with whom we disagree politically – assuming basic standards of decency are being respected (meaning no hate, no racism, no Islamophobia and no antisemitism), then what do we, as human beings, have left?

Mira Sucharov is an associate professor of political science at Carleton University. She blogs at Haaretz and the Jewish Daily Forward. This article was originally published in the Ottawa Jewish Bulletin.

Jewry’s maturing relationship

Details are slowly emerging about a major initiative to strengthen Jewish identity in the Diaspora. The plan, coming from the office of Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, has been in the works for months. But details are seeping out slowly – and reaction from the Diaspora is keeping pace.

The plan, called the Prime Minister’s Initiative, is expected to pour $300 million a year into programs that enhance Jewish identity among non-Israeli Jews and to build connections between Israel and the Diaspora. The project is overwhelmingly aimed at the young, proposing a Birthright-style program for teens, more Israeli peers deployed to Diaspora university campuses, and a Global Jewish Service Corps providing young adults an opportunity to work on Jewish-oriented projects.

An editorial in the American Jewish newspaper the Forward took exception to aspects of the plan. “Why should Diaspora Jews – Americans, in particular – trust, depend on and defer to Israelis to strengthen our Jewish identity?” the paper asked. “Why should Israelis pay for Jewish identity programs in the Diaspora when there are pressing needs at home?” the editorial continues, and: “Is making the Israeli government the driver of Jewish identity the best and only way to reach younger, disaffected Diaspora Jews?” A commentator elsewhere has suggested the plan is intended to reshape Diaspora Judaism into a form that serves Israel’s best interests.

There are several factors here that deserve unpacking. Among the first is the amusing scene of American Jews getting defensive about Israelis deigning to intervene in Diaspora Jewish affairs. Has there been any topic more obsessive to Diaspora – especially American – Jews over the past decades than Israel? There is hardly a Diaspora Jew who doesn’t think they could run Israel better than can Israelis. Yet, turn the tables and suggest Israelis might have something to say about the way Jewish life unfolds around the world and suddenly it’s time for everyone to mind our own business.

It is not surprising that American Jews should be among the first to call out the Israeli initiative. For one thing, the proposal suggests an upturning of the traditional relationship, in which American Jews send money and volunteers to the Jewish state with an underlying sense of benevolent paternalism. Jewish Americans still send huge proportions of philanthropic budgets to Israel and so it may strike them as counterproductive that Israel is now planning on spending $300 million a year on programming for the Diaspora. But it’s about more than the money. Jewish Americans are familiar with their role as the rich, generous benefactors to their younger Israeli cousins. And Americans – Jewish or not – are unaccustomed to having outsiders tell them how they should run their affairs. It is also notable that the strongest reaction should come from American Jews because, statistically, Diaspora Jews are American Jews, for the most part. Seventy percent of Diaspora Jews are Americans. The next largest Diaspora Jewish population is France, with fewer than one-tenth the number of Jews as the United States. Unless explicitly targeting the few thousand Jews of Venezuela, India or Latvia, the term “Diaspora,” numerically speaking, can be interpreted to mean “mostly American.”

It is certainly true, as some commentators have pointed out, that Israel has not really deciphered what Judaism in the 21st century means within the Jewish state, so it may be premature to start exporting a half-baked and often troubled understanding abroad.

But there is no reason to believe that the Prime Minister’s Initiative will seek to tell Reform, Conservative or Orthodox Jews how to daven or order an all-new Chumash for Diaspora synagogues.

In reality, the initiative is perhaps long overdue, an opportunity for the Diaspora-Israel relationship to recalibrate to a more symbiotic dialogue, rather than the unidirectional tradition in which money (and advice) flows only to Israel. It is, in fact, a sign of a maturing of both Israel and the Israel-Diaspora relationship. The question now seems to be whether the Diaspora is mature and secure enough to adapt to the new balance in that relationship.

Unilateralism in store for Israel?

With the collapse of the U.S.-brokered peace negotiations, the Palestinian leadership has embarked on a plan of unilateral action to gain recognition of a Palestinian state and to isolate Israel internationally. Couple those developments with the Fatah movement’s unity pact with the terrorist group Hamas, and Israel is facing a complex reality. Without peace talks, what options does Israel have? Will Israel be forced to take its own unilateral steps?

“If [an] agreement is unachievable, then moving independently to shape the borders of Israel is the better course,” suggested Amos Yadlin, a retired Israeli air force general and former head of the Israel Defence Forces Military Intelligence Directorate. “While it is not the [ideal] alternative, it is better than the status quo or a bad agreement.”

Yadlin, who now serves as director of the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), is among a growing number of respected Israeli leaders putting forth proposals for unilateral steps. In a proposal posted earlier this month on the INSS website, Yadlin argued that Israel has more than the two options usually discussed: a peace agreement and the status quo. According to Yadlin, Israel’s four strategic options are a peace agreement along the parameters established by former U.S. president Bill Clinton at Camp David in 2000, an “unacceptable” peace agreement on Palestinian terms, a status quo in which the Palestinians dictate their own terms or a status quo in which Israel dictates its own terms.

Yadlin argued that while the Clinton parameters – which include the Palestinians agreeing to end the conflict and give up both the “right of return” of Palestinian refugees and dividing Jerusalem – are Israel’s “best option,” it is “highly unlikely” that such an agreement will ever be realized. Instead, Yadlin believes that Israel should promote an “Israeli option” that preserves Israel’s objectives to remain a “Jewish, democratic, secure and just state.” He said this would allow Israel to “independently shape its own borders,” with a strategy towards “advancing a two-state solution.”

Peace talks fail – again

While the announcement of a Fatah-Hamas unity pact on April 23 may seem to have come out of the blue, the resulting collapse of the U.S.-led peace talks was not as surprising.

The negotiations never really gained steam and, just over a month ago, they started their nosedive. Israel announced it would not release another group of prisoners by March 29 unless the Palestinian Authority agreed to extend talks beyond their April 29 deadline (which they did not). On April 1, Israel issued tenders for homes in the east Jerusalem neighborhood of Gilo and, the next day, the Palestine Liberation Organization central council applied for membership in 15 United Nations agencies/treaties. While settlement construction freezes were not a peace-talk commitment, the prisoner releases and abstention from international recognition attempts were concessions that each side offered before the talks began last July.

The day before the unity announcement, PA President Mahmoud Abbas had threatened to hand the West Bank over to Israel if peace talks failed. After the announcement, he said that a unity government under his charge would recognize Israel, accept previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements and have Fatah in control of any weaponry/soldiers. Yet, on April 26, he demanded in return that Israel freeze settlement construction, free prisoners and begin border discussions.

On April 27, more developments. Abbas acknowledged the tragedy of the Holocaust and expressed sympathy for the families of the victims, while Hamas said that, actually, it would never accept Israel as a Jewish state. Also that Sunday, the PLO council decided to pursue membership in another 60-plus UN agencies/treaties. As well, the council refused to recognize Israel’s Jewish nature and demanded “a complete end to the occupation … the illegitimacy of settlements … and a refusal of land swaps,” when Abbas had indicated amenability to “limited land swaps.”

Israel’s cabinet made the decision on April 24 to suspend talks, not willing to deal with any government that included Hamas, a terrorist organization. However, there were dissenting opinions: Justice Minister Tzipi Livni (Hatnua), Finance Minister Yair Lapid (Yesh Atid) and Opposition leader Isaac Herzog (Labor) wanted to leave the door to negotiations open, even in the case of a unity government, if it adhered to the three conditions stipulated by the Quartet (the UN, United States, European Union and Russia): recognizing Israel, accepting previous agreements and renouncing terrorism. That said, Naftali Bennet’s Jewish Home party doesn’t recognize the Palestinians’ right to a state and Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s Likud is deeply divided on the matter.

On Sunday, Netanyahu dismissed Abbas’ Holocaust comments as “damage control,” and said that Israel will look for alternative paths to peace, that he’s “not going to accept a stalemate.” On Tuesday, the Israeli government decided to use the tax funds it collects on behalf of the PA to pay debts owed to it by the PA, and was considering additional sanctions. To that date, Netanyahu had resisted calls from within Israel to unilaterally draw its own borders.

As the United States/U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry went from blaming Israel for reneging on the prisoner release, to blaming both sides for the troubles, to understanding why Israel wouldn’t want to deal with an organization that doesn’t believe in its right to exist in the first place, to viewing the end of talks as an expected “holding period where parties need to figure out what is next,” to using apartheid to describe a possible future Israel, their leadership of the negotiations floundered. Amid this flurry of activity, the EU issued a statement Sunday supporting Palestinian reconciliation as long as a unity government upheld nonviolence, was committed to a two-state solution and accepted Israel’s “legitimate right to exist.” On Monday, the Arab League blamed Israel for the failed talks.

In broad strokes, that’s where things stood at press time. What then are some of the concerns going forward? Analysts have pointed to many, including:

• Hamas may be agreeing to resign from power when the unity government is formed because they hope to win Palestinian public opinion and, eventually, the elections to rule over both Gaza and the West Bank.

• With peace talks off the table, Hamas won’t have to change its stance towards Israel if it forms a coalition with the PA.

• Without the talks, there may be increased violence in/from the West Bank and increased international efforts to boycott Israeli goods and institutions.

• The PA could collapse if the United States withdraws financial aid because of the reconciliation with Hamas, leaving Israel responsible for West Bank residents and the moral issues that entails, as well as more international criticism and the threat of a state in which Arabs will eventually outnumber Jews.

So, as Israel turns 66, it looks like a challenging year lies ahead. We can think of more than one wish to make as the candles are blown out.

The rhetoric of Palestine denial

The intensifying Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations have caused opponents of a Palestinian state to revive former Israeli prime minister Golda Meir’s 1969 canard that “there is no such thing as a Palestinian people.” However, “Palestine denial” is less a debating point than a conversation- stopper: if there are no Palestinians, then there is no Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and thus no need even to discuss West Bank policies. One problem: Palestinians do, in fact, exist.

In December, Israeli diplomat Danny Ayalon posted a YouTube video entitled “The Real Truth About Palestine,” in which he claimed that Palestine is a place, not a nation: “Like Antarctica, the Amazons or Sahara, naming a place doesn’t create a nation of Antarcticans or Saharans.” And in a recent Front Page Magazine essay, Hoover Institution scholar Bruce Thornton referred to “the so-called Palestinians” and stated that the very idea of a Palestinian nation is but “a device for promoting the incremental war against Israel.”

In 2012, three U.S. Republican presidential candidates endorsed Palestine denial: Newt Gingrich called Palestinians “an invented people”; Rick Santorum said “there are no Palestinians … all the people who live in the West Bank are Israelis”; and Herman Cain referred to “the so-called Palestinian people.”

Palestine denial, like Holocaust denial, is easily refuted. Most historians, since the publication of Benedict Anderson’s book Imagined Communities three decades ago, have accepted that every people is invented, some very recently.

Italian consciousness dates to 1764 and, until 1871, Italy wasn’t a country. Earlier residents considered themselves Neapolitans or Venetians or Florentines, and their primary loyalties were to their religion or ruler. But “Italian” is not a timeless identity, nation, or people.

Before a UCLA professor coined “Asian American” in 1968, Americans whose backgrounds were Chinese or Filipino or Japanese weren’t really part of a unified ethnic group. Yet the government now applies census and voting-rights laws to Asian Americans as if they existed – which, today, they do.

Czechoslovakia, carved from former Austro-Hungarian territory containing mostly Czechs but also Germans and Slovaks, lasted from 1918 to 1992. But the state was only partially successful in creating a unified Czechoslovakian identity out of those ethnicities. The joke among Jewish historians is that there were Czechs and Slovaks, but the only Czechoslovaks were the Jews of Prague.

Being Jewish is itself an invented identity. Though Judaism is thousands of years old, it’s not ageless. Ancient concepts of tribes and kingdoms differ greatly from today’s nation idea. In fact, Hebrew has a different word for biblical peoplehood (am) and modern nationhood (l’om). Jewish nationalism traces only to the late 1800s, when secular European Jews faced rising nationalist antisemitism in their countries of residence, as expressed in France’s Dreyfus Affair and the Russian pogroms. The central Zionist myth of uninterrupted but dispersed Jewish nationhood with consistent identity tracing to biblical times and finally gathering in modern Israel is historically inaccurate.

Palestinian identity and peoplehood started in the early 20th century, but intensified after the events of 1948 and 1967. The Palestinian nation then developed a strong sense of shared history and future, grievance and aspiration. It has a flag, a shared language (Palestinian Arabic), particular cuisine and a varied literary canon.

Palestine denial is hackneyed and utterly predictable. Its followers boast of the following 1977 citation by Zuheir Muhsain of the Palestine Liberation Organization’s pan-Arabist faction: “The Palestinian people does not exist. The creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel.” The obsession over a hoary 35-year-old quote from a Palestinian with a minority viewpoint suggests no other textual evidence exists.

Deniers also champion Mark Twain’s 1867 Innocents Abroad, always using the same passage, which describes Palestine in part as a “desolate country” where Twain “never saw a human being on the whole route.” But this 68-word mantra, presented as a single coherent opinion, selectively combines sentences and phrases from pages 488, 520 and 555 of the travelogue. Never mentioned are Twain’s half-dozen anecdotes about encounters with Arabs in Palestine. Innocents Abroad actually offers more support to the Palestinian narrative than the Zionist one.

Finally, West Bank residents are purportedly just a motley collection of Arab economic migrants, not a unified nation. Of course, the United States was also populated by economic migrants, and everyone recognizes the American people.

Denial rhetoric invalidates Palestinian rights by contradicting common sense and nearly all nationalism scholarship. It also leads to very strange questions. Are Italians a nation? Do Pakistanis (a 75-year-old identity) deserve a state? Should we tell a person who says she’s Asian American, “No, you’re not”?

Opponents of a Palestinian state can raise many legitimate points. But the “myth of Palestine” is not one of them. The idea needs to be retired, so real discussions about the Israeli and Palestinian futures can start.

David Benkof has a master’s degree in modern Jewish history from Stanford. He teaches Hebrew in Jerusalem. He can be reached at davidbenkof@gmail.com.