Tag: Einat Wilf

Israelis not that divided

Dr. Einat Wilf and Mark Regev spoke at a Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs event Feb. 9.

Canadian Jews who don’t like the look of Israel’s new government should not withdraw from engagement with that country and its discourse, but get more involved, says Dr. Einat Wilf, a former Labour party member of the Knesset.

Leaders in the North American Jewish community are expressing concerns over the new government and aspects of its policy agenda, while others worry that the always-present fear of schisms between Israeli and Diaspora Jewry could be reaching a breaking point. But Wilf said this is a time for overseas Jews to act strategically to influence policies that reflect their priorities.

Wilf, who served in the Knesset from 2010 to 2013, is an author, businessperson and one-time foreign policy advisor to Shimon Peres. She was part of a panel convened by the Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs Feb. 9. Wilf engaged with Mark Regev, who is chair of the Abba Eban Institute for Diplomacy and Foreign Relations at Reichman University and a former spokesperson and senior foreign affairs advisor to Binyamin Netanyahu. He also served as Israel’s ambassador to the United Kingdom. Yaron Deckel, the Jewish Agency for Israel’s director for Canada and a veteran Israeli journalist, moderated the event.

Wilf said it is up to Canadian Jews to decide how to respond to the political situation in Israel. “But my personal view is that this is perhaps the time for Jews outside Israel to fund more and channel money and efforts to things that have to do not with welfare but actually with how Israel is Jewish,” she said. “North American Jews, if they want Israel to be hospitable to their kind of Jewish practice, they need to make a stark choice.”

The Conservative and Reform movements in Israel are simply too small to be major players in this discussion and so the more practical camp with which Diaspora adherents of those denominations can partner to meet their goals is the secular movement, Wilf said. This is the most likely way to advance policies such as egalitarian prayer at the Kotel, liberal interpretations of identity for aliyah and reducing the powers of the chief rabbinate.

Both panelists attempted to dispel some conventional wisdom, including that Israeli society is divided, turning its back on liberalism and getting more and more religious.

“Israeli democracy, as it stands now, is more inclusive, more representative of the greater diversity of voices than it has been probably throughout its history,” said Wilf. That diversity, by its very inclusiveness, has opened the door to ideas that can be considered contrary to traditional progressive Israeli values, she argued. “That means that more non-liberal voices are represented than ever before.”

Regev concurred. The “good old days” of early Israeli democracy were, he said, “a one-party state run by the Labour Party.… It was a much more conformist society, it was difficult for gays, it was difficult for women, it was a society that was more closed, it was difficult for Mizrahim,” he said. “Today, I have no doubt if you look at the trajectory, Israel is more liberal, more pluralist, more open, more free than ever before.”

A couple of decades ago, Regev noted, if you wanted to go out for dinner in Jerusalem on a Friday night, you had to travel to east Jerusalem. “Now, in Jewish Jerusalem, you have all sorts of places you can go to,” he said. “The idea that Israel is becoming only more religious, more Haredi, more Orthodox is just not true.”

One of the areas where most Israelis agree, said Wilf and Regev, is on the Palestinian issue. After Yasser Arafat ended the peace process and started the Second Intifada, and his successor Mahmoud Abbas demonstrated no more conciliatory a tone, Israelis realized the ball was not in their court. All they can do is wait for a change of leadership on the Palestinian side, both said.

The fiercest divisions in Israeli society right now are over proposals to reform the judiciary, including allowing the Knesset to override Supreme Court decisions by a majority vote and to hand the power of judicial appointments to politicians.

Deckel noted that Canadian legalist Irwin Cotler has warned that the judicial overhaul would make Israel a flawed democracy and other Jewish leaders in North America have spoken up in ways that are rare or unprecedented against some of what the new government is advocating.

“Is there really a threat to Israeli democracy?” asked Regev. “I’m not so sure. I don’t believe there is. I believe Israeli democracy is strong. I believe we can debate the pros and cons of the different judicial reforms put on the table without having to say this is the end of democracy.”

Both commentators think fears of the new government are overblown, although Wilf has a caveat. She has studied past Netanyahu governments and concluded their bark is generally worse than their bite or, at least, that the “hysteria” with which they were met was not commensurate with the policies they enacted.

“All Netanyahu governments, especially the one of 2015, were received with complete hysteria and none of it materialized,” said Wilf. “Sometimes the exact opposite. Netanyahu turned out to be much more centrist, careful, generally very much eschewing violence and conflict and even bringing peace agreements.”

A difference now, said Wilf, is that Netanyahu is head of a more ideologically narrow government, where in the past he had built fairly broad coalitions.

“For Netanyahu, that was very comfortable,” Regev said. “Because, when you have a coalition partner to the left of you and a coalition partner to the right of you, that allows you to be the conductor of the orchestra, so to speak.”

Regev sees a danger in Diaspora Jews who disagree with events in Israel airing dirty laundry, but Wilf said that is the least of her concerns. No matter who is in charge or what policies they advance, overseas opponents will make the same case, she said. “They still would have argued that Israel is a settler-colonial, apartheid, genocidal, white European blah blah blah,” she said. “That’s how they work.”

Addressing the widespread spike in antisemitism, Regev sees a silver lining. “You could be very cynical and you could say some things don’t change. But something has changed,” he said. “Something very important has changed. Unlike my father when he was a child and the Jews were stateless and defenceless and knocking on people’s doors [saying] ‘Please let me in so they won’t kill me,’ today we can proudly say that, if something has changed, the Jews have changed. We have a state. We have a successful state. With all our problems, Israel is a very successful country, politically, economically, diplomatically, militarily. We can protect ourselves.”

Gail Adelson-Marcovitz, national chair of the board of the Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs, opened the online event, which attracted more than 1,000 participants. “Many of us believe that Israel is a state of the totality of the Jewish people and not just its citizens,” she said. “While it is the citizens of Israel who elect their government, that choice has ramifications for many aspects of our partnership and specifically impacts Diaspora Jews. We feel that our interest must, at the very least, be heard, if not respected, particularly in those areas where we are impacted.”

“Right of return” a poison pill?

Among Middle East observers, there has long been a view that the demand for a Palestinian “right of return” is a bargaining chip that would be negotiated away in a final status agreement, perhaps in exchange for a symbolic but small number of Palestinian refugees admitted to Israel and a substantial amount of money as compensation.

In a new book, two prominent Israeli progressives argue that this assumption is wrong, that the right of return is an unwavering demand from the Palestinian side and, as a result, represents a poison pill that guarantees no resolution to the conflict or to Palestinian statelessness.

“The Palestinian conception of themselves as ‘refugees from Palestine,’ and their demand to exercise a so-called right of return, reflect the Palestinians’ most profound beliefs about their relationship with the land and their willingness or lack thereof to share any part of it with Jews,” write Adi Schwartz and Einat Wilf in the book The War of Return: How Western Indulgence of the Palestinian Dream has Obstructed the Path to Peace (All Points Books, 2020).

Wilf, a former Labour member of the Knesset, and Schwartz, an academic and journalist for Ha’aretz, have undeniable left-wing credentials. But, while the Israeli left has long been associated with the idea of compromise and idealism, the authors contend that there is little room for any sort of resolution as long as Palestinians cling to the idea that five million or more of them have the right to citizenship in Israel. Part of the failure of successive peace plans, they write, stems from the inability of negotiators to recognize the Palestinians’ tenacity in holding fast on this core issue – and argue that Israelis need to recognize that truth.

“[D]ecades of shuttling, strong-arming the sides, and endless hours of negotiations came to naught because none of the diplomats or negotiators truly understood and dealt with the root causes of the conflict, choosing instead to turn away and focus on that which appeared easier,” they write.

The status of Palestinian refugees is unique in the world. They have their own international agency devoted to the issue: UNRWA, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, while all other refugees fall under the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. In this sole instance, the definition of “refugee” has been amended to become an inheritable status, meaning that the several hundred thousand Palestinian Arabs dislocated by wars in 1948-1949 and 1967 have ballooned to more than five million – even though many or most of the original refugees have died and the vast majority of those seeking “return” have in fact never lived or set foot in the state they claim for their own.

While exponentially more people were made refugees in the same era – in Europe, in the Indian subcontinent and at least 800,000 Jews forced from Arab- and Muslim-majority lands across the Middle East and North Africa – Schwartz and Wilf argue that Palestinians view themselves as having experienced a unique injustice.

They quote Aref al-Aref, a Palestinian writer who was mayor of East Jerusalem under Jordanian rule in the 1950s: “We have been afflicted by a catastrophe, we the Arabs in general and the Palestinians in particular, during this period of time in a way in which we have not been subjected to catastrophe in centuries and in other periods of time.…” Another Palestinian scholar, in 1950, wrote: “It is the most terrible disaster befalling the Arabs and the Muslims in modern history.… It is a deep-rooted disaster, far-reaching and full of dangers. It is an evil growing by the day and by the hour.” Another writer compared it with the Muslims losing Spain in the Middle Ages.

This almost apocalyptic language precludes compromise on what Palestinians have been promised through the generations by their leaders, according to the book. And, while plenty of voices, including academics, activists and politicians, have argued that the right of return would not be such a terrible thing for Israel’s well-being, the authors provide plenty of evidence that the proposed migration of millions of Palestinian Arabs into Israel is perhaps less about justice for refugees than it is about doing to the country through demographics what the Arab world has been unable to do militarily.

“It is well known and understood that the Arabs, in demanding the return of the refugees to Palestine, mean their return as masters of the homeland and not as its slaves. With greater clarity, they mean the liquidation of the state of Israel,” said a senior Egyptian politician in 1949, at the beginning of the refugees’ long history.

As an article in a Lebanese newspaper put it, the Palestinians’ return would “create a large Arab majority that would serve as the most effective means of reviving the Arab character to Palestine while forming a powerful fifth column for the day of revenge and reckoning.” Arab League Secretary-General Azzam Pasha viewed the refugees’ return as making it possible for “an irregular army that would be in a position to cause a great deal of inconvenience to the Jews by acts of sabotage.”

To ensure that the plan was not foiled, no matter how long it took to reach fruition, a now-seven-decade-old scheme was hatched to prevent Palestinian refugees in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and elsewhere from putting down roots, argue the authors.

“The rehabilitation of the refugees in Arab countries would have meant the end of the war, but that was not what the Arabs wanted,” they write. While the Palestinians were made pawns of the Arab League’s campaign of “denormalization” against Israel, the book portrays most refugees as at least semi-willing players. Attempts to find resolutions to their statelessness have been met with outrage. When Canada’s foreign minister suggested some Palestinian refugees might find a permanent home in Canada, he was burned in effigy in Nablus.

UNRWA, which was presumably begun with the best of intentions, has been consumed by politics and corruption and usurped into what the authors contend is effectively a globally funded branch of the Palestinian liberation movement. Agency-funded textbooks used in Palestinian schools have been shown for decades to inculcate Jew-hatred, venerate terrorists and incite violence. Nevertheless, Palestinians receive through UNRWA among the most per capita humanitarian aid in the world and live a life of which most refugees – and the poor in most Arab countries – can only dream.

From the start, UNRWA’s first annual report, in 1951, noted that many or most refugees were enjoying a better way of life than they had before 1948, receiving universal free education and quality healthcare. The UNRWA schools, now with more than three generations of alumni, have created a uniquely well-educated population of refugees, but, along with reading, writing and arithmetic, the curriculum has created “an embittered, angry and frustrated generation, raised on myths about ethnic cleansing by the Jews, the perfidy of Arab leaders, a sense of victimhood and a refusal to take responsibility for the results of the Palestinians actions in the years and months before Israel’s birth and thereafter,” Wilf and Schwartz write.

The book does not paint an optimistic picture. Western diplomats, peacemakers and politicians refuse to recognize the Palestinian demand of return seriously and continue to believe it can be negotiated away.

“If return were truly just a bargaining chip,” write the authors, “it could have and would have been bargained long ago for a Palestinian state. Rather, it is a Palestinian state that is repeatedly bargained away in order to keep fighting for return.”

There are plenty of issues to discuss – if there were negotiations occurring – but, they argue, the entire Palestinian case rests on the thing Israel must reject.

“The one article that Israel could absolutely not agree to, as it entailed its very suicide, was the one without which the conflict would never end,” write Schwartz and Wilf.