This time, a road map

Editorial

The so-called road map to peace in the Middle East unveiled by U.S. President George W. Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell seems to be creating some dialogue where none existed. The Palestinians and Israelis appear ready to sit down and talk together substantively for the first time since the intifada began to take its murderous toll nearly three years ago.

The road map, which was created by the Americans, but is backed by the United Nations, the European Union and Russia, is meant to create a foundation of trust before the meat-and-potatoes of Mideast peace is put on the table. That is, the major issues are being delayed to a final, third round of discussions leading to a Palestinian state by 2005.

The first round is intended to see the new Palestinian leadership put a permanent halt to terrorism. At the same time, Israel is to prevent additional Jewish settlement in the West Bank and Gaza. Considering both these acts were prerequisites to previous peace initiatives, this plan doesn't look too radical. Israel objects to the idea that its halt to expanding settlements should occur parallel to the Palestinians cessation of violence, but this timeline issue will probably not be enough to derail the whole process.

In the second phase, a normalization of relations will begin between the two parties, with civilian infrastructures necessary to statehood being created on the Palestinian side.

The most difficult, contentious issues will be held over to the third phase, on the assumption that a degree of trust will have been built up in the intervening time.
For all its hopeful words, Israelis and many Jews in Canada view the whole process with some predictable suspicion. There have been peace processes before, we needn't be reminded, and the last one resulted in, so far, nearly three years of sustained Palestinian terrorism. But some things have changed, which should offer a ray of hope.

It is not Yasser Arafat with whom Israel will negotiate. The idea of returning to a negotiating table with Arafat was not worth entertaining. He may not be a spent force within the Palestinian leadership and grassroots, but he has used up every ounce of capital he had with international players who once saw him as a legitimate negotiator for peace. Whether Arafat's hand is directly behind the violence taking place in Israel, or whether he is merely too weak to keep it in check, is irrelevant. Either way, Arafat has nothing to offer, either because he can't or won't deliver.

Whether Mahmoud Abbas, the new Palestinian prime minister, is truly a new face of Palestinian leadership will remain to be seen. But he has one huge advantage: He's not Arafat and he claims to offer a willingness to make peace.
Like Abbas, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon was not part of the last "peace process." Unlike Abbas, Sharon is in his current post because he was seen as a hard-liner who could quell terrorist violence. Abbas is being marketed as a soft-liner who argues that violence hasn't worked for the Palestinians.

It's not surprising to see Sharon demurring at some of the proposals in Bush's so-called "road map" to peace. Why wouldn't he be skeptical? Nothing in the 55-year relationship between Israel and the Palestinians has given Sharon anything concrete to view as a substantial goodwill gesture toward lasting peace. Arafat destroyed any trust that had been built up. How many times should Israel make the same or similar offers only to be met with further violence?

But for everything the Bush administration may have done wrong on this issue, there is a certain ingenuity in the new plan. The idea is that substantial trust will have been built up over the first two phases, so that the discussion of divisive issues such as Jerusalem and the "right of return" will take place in a more amenable environment. The three-stage process will go nowhere until the Palestinians disarm their terrorists. In other words, we won't have to wait until 2005 to see if we've been betrayed again.

Most importantly, though, it requires more of the Palestinians in the first phase than it does of the Israelis. If the Palestinians truly disarm their terrorist forces, we may see a revolutionary rapprochement. If not, Israel will, ideally, be no worse off than at present.

Perhaps most significant of all is that the Palestinians, for the first time, have an explicit quid pro quo to discourage murder. End violence and you'll have a state by 2005. Continue violence and statehood becomes an increasingly remote fantasy.

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