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May 17, 2002
A stick needs a carrot
Editorial
The decision by Likud's central committee to back off from the
policy of working toward an eventual Palestinian state is wholly
understandable. The terrorist per- petrators who have waged war
against Israel should not be tempted with even the suggestion of
reward for their murderous actions. The Palestinian leadership needs
to understand that the more terrorism Israel is subjected to, the
further a Palestinian state moves from the realm of the possible.
Understandable the decision may be. But sensible it is not. Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon has defiantly said he will not be bound by
his party's vote. He will continue with the strategy he has engaged,
which combines both carrot and stick.
This is the wisest move. Any diplomat will say that nothing can
be removed from the table before negotiations begin. While Palestinians
need to have an inescapable understanding that violence will not
get them a state, there should remain enough carrot to encourage
them to renounce violence and return to the negotiating table. By
precluding the idea of a Palestinian state, Likudniks attempted
to remove that carrot.
In terms of international opinion, the move was particularly impolitic.
The theoretical support for a Palestinian state is part of what
gives Israel the high ground in this conflict. Israel has always
been willing to negotiate a Palestinian state, but the Palestinians
took up arms instead. To refuse to entertain the idea of a Palestinian
state, that high ground is lost. If Sharon accepted his party's
stand, Israel not terror would appear to be the main
obstacle between Palestinians and their national aspirations.
Sharon was correct to stand his ground.
Of course, the real issue may not have been Palestinian sovereignty
at all. The subtext of the exercise was, in fact, a power play by
former prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu and his supporters to undermine
the leadership of Sharon.
The irony should be obvious. Sharon was elected as the hard-liner,
but found he could not operate diplomatically from an inflexible
position.
Netanyahu is now playing the hard-liner, though back in office,
he would almost certainly return to the flexible position necessary
for successful diplomacy.
The whole incident was more of a political ploy than a serious policy
disagreement. It is sad that Likud's internal machinations will
harm Israel's foreign reputation.
^TOP
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