Keep the Israeli army as it is

MICHAEL OREN

Today, most North Americans' knowledge of war is secondhand, culled from television, newspapers, films and the occasional book. The Israeli experience could not be more different: The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) is a citizens' army, comprised primarily of 18- to 21-year-olds performing their mandatory service, and reservists on active duty until the age of 36. With the exception of limited numbers of ultra-Orthodox students and those deemed physically or psychologically unfit, all Israeli Jews are expected to serve. Indeed, along with voting, speaking Hebrew and keeping abreast of the news, army service has always been a crucial part of Israeli society – a basic component of Israeliness.
The nature of the IDF, then, makes it nearly impossible to imagine a scenario in which, should Israel's existence once again be threatened by a coalition of hostile armies, a majority of Israelis remain at home, watching the conflict unfold on TV. Yet this is precisely the scenario envisioned by some Israeli experts, who have recently proposed abandoning the notion of a citizens' army altogether. They suggest that Israel phase out the draft, deploy professional troops and outsource logistical support – food, supplies and transportation – to international security corporations.

This scenario would have been unthinkable during the first five decades of Israel's existence, when the IDF was viewed as both the guarantor of the country's physical survival and a central pillar of the Zionist mission of empowering the Jewish people. Over the last decade, however, the ideological foundation of the IDF – and, with it, Israelis' willingness to serve – has been eroded by the divisive conflicts in Lebanon and the territories, increasing numbers of exemptions granted to religious students and Israel's cultural shift from collectivism to individualism. The nature of warfare – and of Israel's enemies – has also changed. Following the elimination of Saddam Hussein's army, the aging of Syria's arsenal, as well as peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, means that the immediate peril to Israel's security now comes from terrorist cells in the West Bank and Gaza and Tehran's missiles. As a result, fewer than 60 per cent of today's eligible Israelis complete their mandatory military service and only 12 per cent do reserve duty.

Yet calls to do away with the citizens' army are breathtakingly shortsighted. This is, after all, the Middle East: It does not take much imagination to envision a sudden change in the region – an Islamic revolution in Egypt, for example – which would once again place massive, hostile divisions on Israel's borders. If that were to happen after reserve duty had been phased out, for example, Israel would find itself at a loss to meet the challenge: re-imposing conscription is politically difficult in a democracy and rebuilding a competent reserve force takes a long time.

Moreover, the picture of Israelis' willingness to serve is more complex than is often thought. At the beginning of Operation Defensive Shield in April 2002, for example, the response to the reserve call-up exceeded 100 percent; even those no longer on active-reserve rosters reported for duty. The reason is clear: A citizens' army has much more at stake in maintaining the nation's security, and will bring far more motivation to the battlefield when the country is attacked. A professional force cannot be expected to defend the country with the selfless passion that carried the IDF to victory in 1948, 1967 and 1973, and that, more recently, has battled Palestinian terrorism.

But beyond strategic damage, proposals to do away with the citizens' army pull hard at one of the pillars of Israeli democracy. The classic image of the IDF as "melting pot" is far more true than is fashionable to believe, as evidenced by the mass absorption of Jews from Ethiopia and the former Soviet Union in the last decade. Indeed, more than any western country, Israel is threatened by the sheer size and diversity of its immigrant communities, and only the IDF has proven strong enough to counterbalance this force. In an otherwise polarized society, the army is the one place in which Israelis from all walks of life – religious and secular, dove and hawk, rich and poor – join in common cause.

Finally, the continuous flow of civilians into the ranks of the IDF helps prevent the emergence of a military caste whose values might not reflect those of society at large. The ability of the IDF to display unusual levels of sensitivity to civilian casualties throughout nearly six decades of almost uninterrupted warfare is due in large measure to its character as a citizens' army.

These concerns may not be decisive in other western societies. But for the Jewish state, a citizens' army is indispensable. After nearly two thousand years of statelessness, the Jews' hard-won ability to defend themselves represents nothing less than a return to an active role in history. Israel should think twice before relinquishing that role.

Michael Oren, a reserve officer in the Israel Defence Forces, is a senior fellow at the Shalem Centre in Jerusalem. A longer version of this essay appeared in Azure (www.azure.org.il).

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