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June 15, 2007
Civil war in territories
Editorial
When Hamas joined the Palestinian government in a coalition with
Fatah, some in the world community warned of the danger in allowing
an armed militia to enter the chambers of, ahem, a democracy.
Political violence and democracy are antithetical. Parliamentary
democracy depends on elected officials talking out their conflicts,
no matter how long it takes and it can take a while. In Canada,
for instance, we have been dealing with the role of Quebec for decades
and, since 1981, attempting to address the fact that the province
is not a signatory to this country's constitution.
By permitting armed factions to participate in the democratic process
(or, in the case of the Palestinian territories, the pale reflection
of a democratic process) we invite the inevitable sooner or later.
As we see now, when armed factions do not like the slow and compromising
course of democracy, old habits emerge. The violence between Hamas
and Fatah is the direct result of the world community's refusal
to demand that Hamas lay down its arms or engage in the political
process.
Israeli history is often cited as a template for or, more accurately,
a justification for various Palestinian acts. Pre-state Israel was
riven with internal and external conflicts. Both the Irgun and the
Haganah were involved with activities that could reasonably be termed
terrorism or, as it is sometimes called, "national liberation."
The two groups would fight among themselves at the very moment of
the birth of the state of Israel but the victory of the Haganah,
which would form the basis for the Israel Defence Forces, was a
necessary precursor to the evolution of a democratic state. The
Altalina affair, which was the climactic incident in the rivalry
between the two forces, was a fratricidal tragedy. But it was the
last intra-Jewish military incident. It was also a lesson from Israeli
history that the Palestinians might have learned from, but have
not.
By attempting to cut corners and skip the vital step of disarming
all but the government's forces, the Palestinians were destined
to face the brutality we see this week. An additional factor is
the simple equation that a society saturated in violence will eventually
find that violence turning inward.
Ehud Barak, the once and perhaps future prime minister of Israel,
learned one of the hardest lessons of Israel's life when the negotiated
agreements he made with the Palestinians came to nought. The hope
that the Palestinian leaders, whose political modus operandi is
terror, had seen the light of civilization and were committed to
peaceful resolution, proved to be folly. Barak, should he find himself
leading the country again, will almost certainly operate on different
assumptions about the reliability of Palestinian promises.
The grotesque conflict that has erupted into what must now be reasonably
called civil war in the Palestinian territories is symptomatic of
a cancer that has been fully evident for at least seven years. As
we said in this space just last week, there should have been worldwide
revulsion on Sept. 28, 2000, when the Palestinians traded the negotiating
table for guns. There was not. There was no reward for peace, no
punishment for violence.
Of course, the dichotomy of "moderate" Fatah and "terrorist"
Hamas is a false one. It was Fatah led by Yasser Arafat and
his successors whose choice on Sept. 28, 2000, was to opt
for violence, rather than negotiation. This fighting, therefore,
is not an example of a legitimate government versus an insurgency.
It is not even, as it is portrayed in the media, a battle between
two wings of a legitimate government. It is a battle between two
warlord-led factions for whom the security and progress of the Palestinian
people is insignificant.
If Hamas wins, we will see an Iranian- or Syrian-style Islamist
theocracy in the territories. If Fatah wins, well, the fate of the
Palestinian people will be marginally better. But until both sides
commit to democracy and peaceful negotiated resolution to political
differences, there will be no peace.
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